Representing Social Networks with Random Graphs with Arbitrary Degree Distributions
Derivatives The probability p k is given by the kth derivative of G 0 according to:
Moments Moments of the probability distribution can be calculated from the derivative of the generating function. The mth moment equals:
Where the average degree, which I denote by z 1 , is given by z 1 = G 0 0 (1) = P k p k k and the terminology x d dx m means repeating m times the operation: di¤erentiate with respect to x and then multiply by x.
Powers The distribution of the sum of m independent draws from the probability distribution fp k g is generated by the mth power of the generating function G 0 (x). For example, if I choose two individuals at random from the population and sum together the number of friends each person has then the distribution of this sum is generated by the function [G 0 (x)] 2 . To see this, consider the expansion of [G 0 (x)] 2 :
+ (p 0 p 3 + p 1 p 2 + p 2 p 1 + p 3 p 0 ) x 3 :::
In this expression the coe¢ cient of the power of x l is the sum of all products p k p j such that k + j = l. It is therefore the probability that the sum of the degrees of the two individuals will be l. This property can be extended to any power m of the generating function.
App. 1
Proof of Result 1
Proof. Results for the case of independent valuations and connections is given by both Cohen et. al.(2000) and Callaway et. al. (2000) which show via di¤erent means that the critical percolation q c threshold satis…es
If one sets q c = 1 P crit , the expression is then equivalent to F 0 1; P crit = 1 for the case of independent valuations. Callaway et. al. also cover the case where the percolation probability is correlated with number of degrees where the threshold is de…ned by F 0 1; P crit = 1. In addition, earlier work by Molloy and Reed (1995) develop an expression for the critical transition for a graph without percolation in terms of the degree distribution. The result also requires that F 0 (1; P ) is decreasing in P . This is immediate by noting that F 0 (1; P ) = P k kp k q k (P ) P k kp k and dq k (P ) dP 0: Finally @F 0 (1;P ) @P < 0 at F 0 (1; P ) = 1 ensures P crit is unique.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Demand is given by equation 14
where u (P ) = H 1 (1; P ) is the smallest non-negative solution to the self consistency condition:
u (P ) = 1 F 1 (1) + F 1 (u (P )) (6) = P + (1 P ) G 1 (u (P ))
The following lemma gives some properties of u with respect to the price which will be used to prove the theorem.
Lemma 1 Suppose u (P ) is given by equation 6 then 1. u (P ) = 1 and du dP = 0 for P crit P 1 2. u < 1 and du dP > 0 for 0 P < P crit 3. u (P ) is continuous in P Proof. u (P ) is the smallest non-negative solution to:
Now consider the function f (u) = P +(1 P )
. First, the solution u = 1 always satis…es the above relationship. Second, f (u) is a polynomial in u with positive coe¢ cients, thus it is continuous, increasing
App. 2 and convex in the region 0 u 1 and, given f (0) = P , there is at most one other solution 0 u < 1. When f 0 (1) 1 there is no solution for 0 u < 1; and u = 1 is the unique solution. When f 0 (1) > 1 there is a solution for 0 u < 1: The condition f 0 (1) 1 is equivalent to P > P crit :
P crit P Therefore, u = 1 for P P crit and 0 u < 1 for P < P crit . Hence, du dP = 0 for 1 P P crit :
For P < P crit the derivative du dP is:
The numerator is positive for u < 1 and the denominator 1
is continuous and equal to 1 at u = 0, equal to 0 at u = 1 and is decreasing in u for 0 u 1 provided G 00 1 (1) > 0. This is a necessary condition for P crit > 0. Hence, in the range P 2 [0; P crit ), u (P ) is continuous and du dP > 0: Returning to the theorem, I conclude that D(P ) = 0 for P 2 (P crit ; 1] and D(P ) = (1 P ) 1
is a continuous function from the continuity of u in P over these two intervals.
I prove the continuity of D(P ) for the entire interval P 2 [0; 1] by showing that as the price approaches the critical price from below D ! 0. The relationship between P and u may be written:
such that P (u) is a continuous, monotonically increasing (one to one) function [0; 1) ! [ 1; 1]: I will now show that lim u!1 P (u) = P crit . P (1) = 0 0 so applying L'Hopital's rule
Now, since P (u) is a one-to-one function and 0 < P crit < 1, this implies that lim P !P crit u = 1 and hence
This completes the argument for the continuity of D. The next part of the theorem is: For P < P crit dD dP < 0 Proof. Consider the expression for dD dP :
App. 3
The result follows from u < 1 and du dP > 0 for P < P crit :
The …nal element of the proof is:
Proof. The expression for the elasticity is:
where the second term inside the brackets is strictly positive, from lemma 1. The result follows immediately.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. De…ne the fully informed monopoly price as P F I and the WOM monopoly price as P W OM . A monopolist facing a fully informed population has a strictly concave pro…t maximization problem and charges the unique monopoly price P F I = 1+c 2 provided c < 1. If c 1 then there is clearly no price where the monopolist can make positive pro…ts. It is also true that
Theorem 1 proved that j" W OM j > j" F I j, which implies that:
when demand is positive in the range of prices P crit > P P F I : The WOM monopolists pro…t function (P c) D(P ) is continuous and di¤erentiable for P < P crit . Therefore the …rst order conditions for the monopolist are necessary and hence
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. In a Poisson network:
Hence, the standard mark-up formula for the optimal price gives:
App. 4
This is su¢ cient for pro…t maximization provided that:
which is true when (1 P ) z 1 > 1. The condition z 1 > 1 is su¢ cient for this to be the case since P < P crit and 1 P crit = 1 z1 . To complete the proof we show
where
substituting this in and dropping exp [z 1 (u 1)] > 0 from the expression:
which is true since 1 P crit = 1 z1 and for positive demand P < P crit :
6 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The appropriate generalization of P crit for the case of correlation between valuations and friendships is: 
For any c < < 1 we can …nd a distribution such that this condition is satis…ed. For instance, suppose we assume that everyone has the same number of friendships k conditional on not having k = 1. The distribution of friendships is therefore
First, I show that demand will be linear in the region P 2 [c; ]. Consider
In the range of prices P 2 [c; ] ; 
This is independent of q 1 . Thus, 
This is decreasing in P and positive if
1 u > P c. Therefore, the optimal price cannot be less than or equal to
2 . We can use the linearity of
and substitute this in to get the following condition:
When P crit > , u < 1; this can be rewritten using
This is true for u < 1. Hence, the monopoly price is greater than Proof. In the case of perfect assortativity r = 1 there are two separate populations. In this extreme case no type is friends with an individual of a di¤erent type. As a result, demand can be characterized as the sum of the demand curves in each population. These may be calculated separately because neither population is connected to the other. In particular, it is immediate that D (P; 1) > 0;
Note that it is equivalent to consider e ! 0 + rather than r ! 1 : Demand is described by the following two equations " u 1 (P; e) u 2 (P; e) # = 2 6 6 4
It is immediate that D is continuous in e, u 1 , and u 2 in equation 32. It remains to check that u 1 (e),u 2 (e) are continuous in e. In equation 31
Note, that for P 2 h~ ; 1 i , u 1 (0) = u 1 (e) = 1: In this case, the self-consistency condition for u 2 (e) is
and u 2 (e) > u 2 (0). We need to show that for any u 2 (0) < w < 1; 9e > 0 such that for 0 < e < e
Now note that
is continuous, increasing and convex in x, is equal to 1 at x = 1 and for u 2 (0) < 1 the slope is
for all u 2 (P; 0) < x < 1, and we can always choose e so that the condition in equation 36 is satis…ed.
(~ e)u1(P;e)+eu2(P;e)
where u 2 (P; e) < u 1 (P; e) ; u 1 (P; e) < u 1 (P; 0) and u 2 (P; e) > u 2 (P; 0) : We need to show that for any x; y where 0 < y < u 1 (0) ; u 2 (0) < x < 1; 9e > 0 such that for 0 < e < e y < P + 1
where we note that
are continuous, increasing and convex in x with slopes < 1 at u 2 (P; 0) ; u 1 (P; 0) respectively. Therefore, we …nd that
Hence, we can …nd e such that conditions in equation 38 are satis…ed.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Elasticity is given by
App. 8
We need to verify du dP ; dv dP > 0 for the proposition to hold. The self consistency condition for u and v is:
Now treating each condition separately, denote the values u 1 (v; P ) that satisfy the …rst equation and the values v 2 (u; P ) which satisfy the second. For P < P crit u 1 (1; P ) < 1; v 2 (1;
is increasing in u and v. Hence, for a lower solution we would also have du1 dv dv2 du < 1 which is a contradiction that the lower point is a solution. Hence any solution (u ; v ) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1) is unique. Finally using the implicit function theorem on the equations for u; v we …nd the result:
where the numerator is positive and the denominator is
the …nal inequality follows from
9 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Let v be the probability that an edge of a triad is connected to the giant component then:
(43)
App. 9
We can compare this to the probability u that a regular friendships is connected to the giant component:
hence v > u and
where the …rst line comes from p k = p t for k = 2t, second line follows from v > u and the third from the de…nition of demand.
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. When the number of friends and valuations are independent we can write demand as:
and the elasticity as:
where the second term inside the brackets is positive. Note:
App. 10
We check that there is a unique solution to the …rst order condition and it is su¢ cient:
P (1 !) dH 1 dP 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
< 0
The …rst two lines are negative. For small enough the entire term is negative because 
(1 !; P ) = 1 and noting that
then we can choose so that the term above is arbitrarily close to 1: When this is the case the more elastic demand is determined by the term
To …nd the e¤ect of mean-preserving spreads we must consider the e¤ects of second order terms. We can take a Taylor series approximation at = 0 to …nd the relative size of the second order term for small values of : Letting
2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
and evaluating
To consider a mean-preserving spread we must check the second order terms
We can ignore any terms that are linear in as these terms are otherwise …nite and are thus zero in the limit ! 0. Ignoring these terms, the remaining terms are:
(61)
k evaluated at = 0 and rearranging we …nd
iii) The equations under clustering
Just considering the …nal term inside the brackets we de…ne:
Direct e¤ect @f @ :
Indirect e¤ect
2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 
…rst order term
is the same with or without clustering. Now considering the second order terms ignoring any that are linear in 2 dv d 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
In a Poisson network the generating functions are G 0 (x) = G 1 (x) = exp (z 1 (x 1)); hence the …rm's pro…t is given by
and the optimal price and level of advertising P ; ! satisfy:
We need to show @
since D = 1 H 1 (1 !; P ) ; we know
dP hence the elasticity of demand with respect to price is
Holding the price constant, the sign of the derivative w.r.t. ! is sign
Hence @
App. 16 demand is less elastic w.r.t. price as advertising increases ) price and advertising are complements.
Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. The probability generating function of component sizes an individual with k friends belongs to, conditional on not being in the giant component, is given by
The expected component size is
: Also the probability a person with k friends is not in the giant component is u k . Therefore k = arg max k2f0;1:::g
note that for 0 < u < 1 b > 0 the function f (k) = (1 + kb) u k is continuous in k; has a maximum at
the greatest integer below bk c or the smallest integer above k ; dk e : Thus k 2 fbk c ; dk eg for P < P crit (85)
13 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. We have
continuous in u and hence P for P < P crit . Finally
is an upper bound on k .
Proof of Theorem 11
Proof. Demand is given by
where u is the smallest non-negative solution to the self consistency condition:
The following lemma illustrates some properties of u with respect to the price which I will subsequently use to prove the above theorem.
Lemma 2 Suppose u (P ) is given by the smallest non-negative solution to equation 6 and q k (P ) is continuous in P then 1. u (P ) = 1 and du dP = 0 for P crit P 1 2. u < 1 and u (P ) is continuous in P for 0 P < P crit 3. Suppose further that sup k dq k (P ) dP < 1 for all 0 P < P crit then du dP exists for all 0 P < P crit Proof. 1) u (P ) is the smallest non-negative solution to:
Given the assumptions (u; P ) is continuous in both P and u and weakly decreasing and weakly increasing in each respectively. Further it is di¤erentiable and strictly convex in u for u 2 [0; 1] provided sup k dq k (P ) dP < 1 and q k (P ) > 0 for at least one k > 2. If
which implies that the smallest non-negative solution is u = 1 since (u; P ) > u for all u < 1 when P crit P < 1. 2) Consider u (P 0 ) and u (P 00 ) where 0 < P 0 < P 00 < P crit . Given that q k (P ) is weakly decreasing and continuous in P and (u; P ) is continuous, increasing and convex in u then this implies u (P 0 ) < u (P 00 ).
To prove continuity I will show that for any " > 0 such that ju (P 0 ) u (P 00 )j < " then for P 2 (P 0 ; P 0 + ) where = P 0 P 00 2 ju (P 0 ) u (P )j < ". Given the de…nition of P 0 < P < P 00 . By the intermediate value theorem we have that (u; P ) u = 0 has a solution in the interval u 2 [u (P 0 ) ; u (P 00 )]. The continuity of q k (P ) implies that the following is true (u; P 0 ) (u; P ) and (u; P 00 ) (u; P ) for all u: Hence (u (P ) ; P 0 ) < u (P ) < (u (P ) ; P 00 ) implying that u (P 0 ) < u (P ) < u (P 00 ). We now have the result that ju (P 0 ) u (P )j < ".
3) To show di¤erentiability consider the implicit relationship for u : u (u; P ) = 0. Now di¤erentiating
the denominator is positive for P < P crit and the numerator exists provided sup k dq k (P ) dP < 1.
the strictness of the inequality is given by the assumption that for any " > 0 9k > 2 : q k P crit < q k P crit " : Hence u (P ) < 1 for P < P crit .
Using this lemma we now prove the parts of the main theorem.
1) D (P ) is given by
which is continuous if u (P ) is continuous and ( jk) contains no mass points which it does not by assumption.
2) The statement: D (P ) = 0 for P P crit D (P ) > 0 for P < P crit
follows from u (P ) = 1 for P P crit and u (P ) < 1 for P < P crit in the earlier lemma and a positive fraction of individuals with k 1 having valuations above the price.
3) dD dP is given by:
which is 0 when u (P ) = 1 and exists and is decreasing for P < P crit since du dP 0 and P k p k 1 u k ( jk) d > 0 for u < 1. 4) When and k are uncorrelated ( jk) = 1 and du dP > 1 for P < P crit and we have dD dP = du dP
where du dP
